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Abstract
We examine the security of existing radio
navigation protocols and attempt to define
secure, scalable replacements.
1 Motivation
Resourceful and well-funded groups are clearly in-
terested in using aircraft as projectile weapons. In-
creased airport and cockpit security can significantly
increase the difficulty of bombings and hijackings, but
some attacks can be executed without ever touching
their targets: It is possible to lead an aircraft astray
by transmitting noise or false information to its com-
munication and navigation systems, potentially driv-
ing it into terrain or other aircraft.
The radio services currently used in civil aviation
were simply not designed with malicious parties in
mind. Regulatory agencies and the aviation industry
are working together now to develop digital radio pro-
tocols for civil aviation, and they haven’t done any
real work toward security. If the new generation of
avionics were widely deployed without cryptographic
protection, disaster could result, and the costs of
another industry-wide equipment upgrade would be
staggering.
We do not suggest that exploitation of naviga-
tion vulnerabilities is inevitable or easy. Aircraft are
flown by intelligent beings; radio systems are just one
element in pilots’ and controllers’ decision-making
processes. There is enough redundancy in the cur-
rent navigation system that an effective navigation
exploit should require multiple simultaneous trans-
mitters. Professional pilots of functional aircraft do
not unintentionally hit things that they can see out
the window - these problems are specific to flight
in instrument meteorological conditions (clouds, fog,
precipitation, and smoke). Still, an attack or threat
against airborne radio services would have economic
consequences regardless of whether it caused actual
physical damage. Commercial aviation only works
when customers, employees, and investors all feel
safe. Most airline revenue comes from the large, com-
plex terminal areas that are most dependent on com-
munication and navigation; operations would need
to be scaled back in the absence of trustworthy radio
protocols.
The need for navigation security is not exclusive
to aviation. We emphasize examples from that in-
dustry because aircraft in flight have enough kinetic
and potential energy to cause massive destruction.
Surface navigation shares the same essential threats.
Also, as explained further below, navigation is largely
equivalent to precise time transfer. Time and fre-
quency synchronization over radio is common in com-
munication and surveillance networks, and it is easy
to envision time-dependent industrial processes that
would go catastrophically wrong if their time scales
were distorted or their components were desynchro-
nized.
Improving navigation systems’ resilience would
have at least one fortuitous positive effect: easing
deployment of ultra-wideband waveforms. Concerns
about interference with safety-of-life navigation radio
are currently a hindrance to ultra-wideband technol-
ogy’s broad adoption.
2 Threat environment
2.1 Active over-the-air threats
Interference is the accidental masking of signals by
other signals or by natural radio emissions. Re-
sponding to interference is relatively straight-
forward and well-studied: multi-transmitter
services require protocols for arbitrating mul-
tiple access; continuous noise can be countered
by directional antennae, spread-spectrum tech-
niques, and increased transmitter power; inter-
mittent noise necessitates error-correction cod-
ing or otherwise redundant bitstreams.
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Jamming is the intentional masking of a signal
by another transmission, degrading or denying
some radio channel. Anti-jam techniques are
mostly the same as methods to abate interfer-
ence, with two additional requirements. First,
predicting spread-spectrum variables must be
computationally infeasible even given knowl-
edge of all of the transmissions to date or jam-
mers will be able to generate the same sequence
and transmit exactly over the content of the
signal. Second, a jammer must not be able
to detect the current hop frequency quickly
enough to retune to it and transmit before the
information-bearing part of the hop’s waveform
has been entirely sent.1
Intrusion is the intentional transmission of false in-
formation into a communication or position-
ing network to deceive or computationally over-
whelm targets. (Spoofing means roughly the
same thing in the context of navigation; it has
different connotations in computer networking.)
Cryptographic authentication can, by defini-
tion, prevent access-granting2 intrusion on dig-
ital radio networks.
Meaconing is the reception and rebroadcast of le-
gitimate navigation/time signals.3 Spatially
redirecting or precisely delaying signals in a
navigation system can lead a victim receiver
to an incorrect indication of position. Since
meaconing doesn’t require attackers to predict
signal content, it can’t be prevented by merely
authenticating the navigation bitstream. Re-
sponses to meaconing are the central open prob-
lem addressed here.
2.1.1 Security relationships
There are relationships between notions of security
against these attacks:
• Any protocol that resists jamming is also ro-
bust against interference from benign external
sources, because transmitting any signal inde-
pendent of the target waveform is a subset of
assumed jammer capabilities.
• Analogously, an authentication algorithm that
prevents intentional intrusion from constitut-
ing valid messages also reduces interference and
jamming to denial-of-service threats.
• A system that perfectly resists jamming is also
immune to intrusion and meaconing: anti-jam
security means that a jammer can’t transmit
anything to the system’s receivers, let alone cho-
sen messages. However, secure communication
in the real world still requires authentication,
because jamming resistance is conditioned on
signal-to-jamming ratio and there is a margin in
which a pseudorandom subset of received sym-
bols will be attacker-derived.
2.1.2 Potential source sites for malicious ra-
dio transmissions
• On target aircraft
Ground-based and satellite navaids4 are hun-
dreds to millions of meters away from aircraft
radio receivers; passengers and cargo are just
a few meters away. Thus, transmitters inside
their target aircraft only need thousandths to
trillionths of the output power of legitimate
navaids to overwhelm them. Aircraft bodies
and contents provide some shielding from in-
ternal signal sources, but not enough.
Some intrusion and meaconing attacks neces-
sitate precise knowledge of their targets’ loca-
tions. With transmitters located on the target
itself, that becomes vastly easier.
There is no way for typical airport security
screeners to distinguish between, for instance,
an ordinary laptop and one containing a con-
cealed jammer/spoofer. Portable transmitters
can overpower most non-secure airborne radio
systems in the host plane (and probably others
nearby) for as long as a power source is avail-
able.
• On other aircraft
Airborne jammers have some advantages for
the attacker over ground-based transmitters:
1“Follow-on jamming”.
2As opposed to denial-of-service.
3“Meaconing” is sometimes used more broadly to mean any sort of intrusion into navigation channels, but a narrow definition
is more useful in our context.
4Navigational aids: devices that transmit or reflect a signal to indicate a client’s position.
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increased exposure of low-altitude targets, in-
creased distance to horizon, and decreased sus-
ceptibility to directional antenna nulling.
Powered craft controlled by malicious parties
are easy to locate; in rural areas they are also
easy to destroy, but targeting one in an ur-
ban environment carries a high risk of civil-
ian casualties. The airborne threat is not
limited to engine-powered vehicles: GPS jam-
ming devices with considerable range that fly
on small helium balloons and toy gliders have
been demonstrated.[1] Weather balloons and
balloon-launched gliders can rise well above
the ceilings of most fighter aircraft. Although
above-cloud altitudes leave them visually de-
tectable, they have such a low thermal signa-
ture and radar cross-section (unless specifically
designed to be radar-reflective) that they’re
effectively invisible to most seeking technolo-
gies. The best available conventional response
is anti-radiation missiles (ARMs), which are ex-
pensive and limited in availability. Any security
force considering an ARM needs to be very sure
that the radiating target is not a passenger air-
craft. ARMs are not even likely to be effec-
tive when wind velocity is relatively high if the
attacker uses a constellation of balloon-based
jammers that are each only active a fraction of
the time.
• On the ground
Ground- and sea-based transmitters have by far
the most power available to them—even a mo-
bile station can output thousands of watts of
signal—and they are capable of disabling all un-
secured airborne radio for everything above the
horizon.
2.2 Passive over-the-air threats
The passive threats of concern in military trans-
mission security5—detection, location, identifica-
tion, and interception—are of much less impor-
tance in civil aviation. Civilian flights operate mostly
on schedule between known airports, carrying un-
trusted passengers and cargo, with no infrared or
radar countermeasures and little ability to maneu-
ver to avoid projectiles. One of our major goals in
preventing midair collisions is to ensure that aircraft
know where all other (untrusted) nearby aircraft are,
which obviously negates stealth. Still, we will cur-
sorily examine observability and try to minimize it
when possible.
2.3 Physical threats
In addition to the threats posed by independently
sited malicious transceivers, aviation radio facilities
(particularly unstaffed remote navaids) are vulnera-
ble to access-granting physical attacks that subvert
cryptologic security:
• Navaid movement. Whether communication
channels from a navaid are secure is irrelevant
if the navaid can be picked up and relocated.
• Directional antenna alteration. Likewise,
navaids that indicate a client’s current azimuth
or elevation angle can be rotated, be reconfig-
ured, or have their direction sensors changed.
• Navaid antenna remoting. If the transmit-
ter itself is secured or just difficult to move,
its transmit or receive antennae could be con-
nected to a long cable and relocated. This isn’t
a likely risk for high-power transmitters or com-
plex directional antenna arrays, but it is cer-
tainly a concern for time-of-flight-based navaids
and landing path indicators.
• Output meaconing via antenna connec-
tion. Dropping a delay device directly between
the navaid processor and its antenna obviates
the need to overpower or jam the navaid’s orig-
inal transmission.
• Input meaconing via antenna connection.
Navaids that get information about their posi-
tions and/or the time via other navaids could be
subject to meaconing by devices connected to
their antenna inputs; that would be vastly eas-
ier than over-the-air meaconing against moving
targets.
• Deceptive parameter modification. If the
operator interface of a navaid is insufficiently
secure, an intruder could change navigation-
critical parameters. In timestamped protocols,
if the navaid’s clock is subject to tampering,
much of the protection of cryptographically-
secured navigation protocols is negated.
5Methods for preventing an adversary from reading from or writing to a communication channel; this primarily refers to
spread-spectrum techniques.
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• Cryptographic equipment theft. The
entire navaid doesn’t necessarily need to
be moved—if cryptographic modules can be
covertly stolen and connected to a different
transmitter without zeroizing them, the navaid
is compromised.
• Key compromise. Navaid keys can be leaked
locally through probing, compromising emana-
tions, fault injection, power/timing/heat anal-
ysis, and so on.
3 Methods of radionavigation
A radio signal can be completely characterized by
amplitude as a function of position, direction, polar-
ization, and time. For conventional (sinusoidal, non-
UWB) transmission systems, it is useful to further
decompose time variation into carrier frequency, car-
rier phase, and modulated content. We can then cat-
egorize navigation schemes according to which values
are measured by the receiver.
Each of these measurements establishes that the
receiver’s position is near some geometrical object: a
circle if we’re measuring distance, a hyperbola for dis-
tance differences, a ray or a set of rays for direction.
Actual 3D position is given by the intersection of sev-
eral similar or different position objects, or sometimes
the intersection of position loci with physical objects
like the earth’s surface.
3.0.1 Design limitations
If every client had a continuous channel with every
navaid, protected by effective transmission security,
we could assume that it was not subject to external
manipulation; navigation using such channels would
be secure. This security model is appropriate for and
currently used by military organizations. However, in
a true public service, the combination of thousands of
potential users and the large bandwidths consumed
by spread-spectrum links would necessitate massively
parallel navaid transceivers and huge swaths of spec-
trum. We need to examine what can be done to as-
sure secure navigation without full transmission se-
curity.
Cost limitations preclude building navigation pro-
tocols for which clients require complex directional
antenna clusters (phased arrays, etc.). Although that
may change as adaptive antenna technology begins to
penetrate the consumer market, we will assume sim-
ple (omnidirectional or fixed unidirectional) antenna
designs for client nodes.6
3.0.2 Cryptographic requirements
The security protocols that follow presume the ex-
istence of a few non-malleable7 cryptographic primi-
tives applicable to messages of arbitrary length:
• a hash function H
• an integrity-preserving symmetric encryption
transform family ek, dk
• a public-key signature transform family
Spriv, Vpub,M : Priv → Pub
• an integrity-preserving public-key encryption
transform family Epub, Dpriv,M : Priv → Pub
Some sort of certification and revocation architec-
ture is also necessary to bind navaid identifications
to public keys, and to let protocol participants de-
termine what degree of confidence in each binding
is appropriate. Any good implementation will pro-
vide a flexible language for users and administrators
to assign trust in keys, algorithms, equipment certi-
fications, and so on. We discuss specific certificate
contents in section 6, below.
For clarity, we describe some protocols that don’t
provide anonymity or secrecy. All of them are readily
adaptable by adding an outer layer of encryption or
transmission security.
Passive-client systems
3.1 Carrier amplitude
Description
In this simplest navigation scheme, navaids trans-
mit a continuous signal. The received signal strength
determines distance to the transmitter.
Examples
Primitive homing receivers
Security
Unsecurable. Simply transmitting an unmodu-
lated carrier or a noise signal will change the per-
ceived distance to the navaid, even if the authorized
6Building ground transponders for pre-existing airborne traffic and weather radar antennae might be worth considering,
though.
7Detailed analysis of security requirements on these algorithms is beyond our scope.
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signal is cryptographically authenticable. In fact, this
method is so sensitive to equipment vagaries and en-
vironmental propagation conditions that it’s not very
useful at all. With frequency hopping, the best pos-
sible output recovered relative to a jamming environ-
ment would be a distance that jumps around the ap-
proximate range to the legitimate source as the chan-
nel frequency hits other transmitters.
3.2 Carrier amplitude anisotropy
Description
Navaids transmit a simple continuous signal. Re-
ceivers use directional antennae to determine the
headings to transmitters.
Examples
NDBs/ADF; S&R and SIGINT DF receivers
Security
Unsecurable in the navaid context. Cost-
effective implementations of this technique use sim-
ple loop/sense antenna pairs that can’t distinguish
between multiple emitters. Broadcasting an unmod-
ulated carrier or noise on the beacon frequency will
deflect direction measurements made on such an an-
tenna pair.[2] Frequency hopping would also be un-
likely to help here.
3.3 Carrier frequency
Description
Navaids transmit at a precise known frequency.
By measuring actual received frequencies, the client
obtains the Doppler shift of each signal and, there-
fore, the client’s velocity relative to each navaid,
which determines its position. For this to work, ei-
ther the client or the navaid needs to be moving, and
one or the other must have a predictable position or
path.
Examples
NNSS/Parus, SARSAT/COSPAS, Argos; S&R
and SIGINT DF receivers
Security
Unsecurable. Frequency measurements are quite
sensitive to narrow-band jamming and intrusion, and
again could be altered by transmitting unmodulated
signals. Frequency hopping seems unlikely to be
compatible with precise frequency measurement of
a transmitter not otherwise synchronized with the
client, due to oscillator construction limitations.
3.4 Modulated signal content
Description
Navaids transmit anisotropic signals; the content
of the received message determines the client’s az-
imuth or elevation angle from the navaid.
Antenna direction can be fixed (as in an indica-
tor that an aircraft is above or below the desired glide
path for landing) or varying (as in some general meth-
ods for determining azimuth from a navaid). If vary-
ing, the directionality can be created by one antenna
physically moving in a circle, or an antenna array
electronically scanned (circularly or randomly).
Examples
VOR/Localizer, TACAN azimuth guidance, ILS
glide-slope indicator, ILS marker beacons
Security
Somewhat securable. The most serious threats
to this method are navaid movement, antenna alter-
ation, antenna remoting, and meaconing. Clearly this
implies navaids with strong physical security - no un-
staffed terrestrial implementation of it can ever be
secure.
Signal-content-based navigation is eminently
compatible with all types of transmission security,
which would make over-the-air attacks difficult.
The following protocol prevents most easy attacks
against systems that can’t use transmission security,
and adds a degree of resilience to those that can:
3.4.1 Protocol 1: Passive signal-content nav-
igation
Navaid sends:
p Navaid position
d Navaid antenna direction
t Timestamp
i Navaid identifier8
Sk(p, d, t, i) Signature of navigation data
Because a valid signature is not predictable in
a reasonable computation time without knowing the
navaid’s private key k, reception of a correct message
by the client guarantees three things:
• At or after the time t, a communication chan-
nel existed from the indicated navaid’s antenna
(which the navaid believed to be pointed in the
indicated direction at that time) to the client.
• The current time is at or after t plus the sig-
nal’s travel time to the aircraft. So given a
time source accurate to the duration of the time
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step between direction messages (a few millisec-
onds), a client can exclude older replayed direc-
tion packets.9
• Therefore, a successful meaconer must be able
to receive transmissions in realtime from the di-
rection that it wants to tell victims is correct.
Meaconing could be done via high-gain antennae
that receive sidelobe signals, but that has a partial
defense: the navaid can transmit a jamming signal
from an omnidirectional antenna co-sited with its di-
rectional one. This masking jammer must be signifi-
cantly stronger at any position available to untrusted
equipment than the directional antenna’s strongest
sidelobe and any information-bearing spurious prod-
uct or other unintentional emanation of the naviga-
tion transmitter. It also must have the same polar-
ization. If site features permit, antennae should be
masked to prevent any non-airborne adversary from
receiving the directional signal at all. If possible,
aircraft using a runway-mounted navaid for landing
guidance should use forward-pointing directional an-
tennae to exclude off-axis attackers.
With these safeguards in place, a node in receipt
of a navigation message knows that it was either re-
ceived directly from the navaid or redirected by a re-
ceiver that is airborne and in the antenna’s direction
right now (though the meaconing transmitter might
not be). Particularly, it should be quite difficult to
maliciously tell users of an instrument landing scheme
that they’re on the correct heading and glide slope to
land - an attacker who can insert physical objects
into or on an extension of the landing path would be
better off just going after the aircraft directly. As for
general azimuth-indicating navaids like VOR, there’s
little we can do to prevent their signals from being
redirected; the passive signal-content technique has
limited security unless transmission security is used.
3.5 Modulated signal timing
Description
Navaids either individually transmit a signal indi-
cating the precise current time or cooperate to trans-
mit a simple signal in a precisely-timed sequence.
Clients, measuring message arrival times, determine
position to be either on a sphere based on absolute
time of flight or on a hyperboloid based on difference
in time of flight. Time-of-flight-based navigation does
not require either navaids or clients to use directional
antennae, so it is suitable for mobile peer-to-peer use.
Examples
GPS, LORAN-C, OMEGA/ALPHA; Link-16/
TADIL-J/MIDS/JTIDS, EPLRS/SADL
Security
Securable. The level of assurance is dependent on
the number of navaids receivable at the client posi-
tion.
For small, mutually-trusting node groups, trans-
mission security is readily added to this navigation
scheme - some existing protocols already use fre-
quency hopping, time hopping, and direct-sequence
spread spectrum together with signal-timing-based
navigation.
3.5.1 Protocol 2: Passive time-of-flight navi-
gation (post-authenticated)
Navaid sends:
p Navaid position
d Navaid antenna direction
t Timestamp
i Navaid identifier
Sk(p, d, t, i) Signature of navigation data
(Note that navaid transmissions in this protocol
are identical to Protocol 1. We examine combining
them in a later section.)
The difference between t and the client’s clock
value when the client received t is the sum of clock
error, propagation time, and meaconing delay. A
client without a priori knowledge of two of these val-
ues can’t determine the other one, so ranging or time
synchronization based on a single navaid is inherently
insecure. However, each received t establishes a lower
bound for the actual current time, and messages from
different navaids arrive with little enough time be-
tween them that the client can accurately measure
the elapsed time. If any pair of messages is received
with timestamps that indicate the difference between
the two is farther than the maximum difference in sig-
nal travel time, at least one navaid is being meaconed.
Hence, receiving a single non-meaconed navaid signal
sets an upper bound for undetected meaconing delay;
unfortunately, that bound represents a distance error
on the order of the distance between navaids, so we
need to add additional security checks.
Consider a client navigating by multilateration us-
ing Protocol 2 alone. Receiving three navaids speci-
9Note that the timeliness guarantee places an upper bound on the computational workfactor available to the meaconer, so
some cryptanalytic and signal-detection techniques are infeasible.
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fies a 3D position; receiving four corrects for client
clock inaccuracy. If we add a fifth, we can solve
for another variable: the delay time of a single mea-
coned navaid. Furthermore, the client can model the
measured geometry of the navaids in view and com-
pare it to the position relationships established by the
navaids’ signed positions; meaconing will make them
inconsistent.
Without an independent and highly accurate
clock on the client, it is fundamentally impossible to
detect using passive techniques alone whether all of
the navaid signals arriving at the client’s position are
being simultaneously delayed. It would be technically
challenging to remotely specify an arbitrary position
to a moving platform, but two replay attacks are easy:
• placing a simple meaconing device (wideband
analog-digital converter, digital delay line,
wideband digital-analog converter) on the tar-
get platform so that, for instance, it thinks it’s
at the position in the landing approach that it
was a few seconds ago.
• using a bent-pipe transponder to retransmit the
signals received by one client so that others
think they have its position. (Note that this
is only likely to be persuasive if both clients are
airborne or both are ground-based.)
These attacks are sufficiently damning in the context
of commercial air navigation that passive navigation
schemes without transmission security such as GPS
should be absolutely ruled out as sole means of navi-
gation for precision approach in zero-visibility condi-
tions.
A differential overlay without transmission secu-
rity on a passive system adds little or no security,
because it’s equally susceptible to simple meaconing.
However, if the differential signal is LPI-secure (as in
some of the proposed military differential GPS solu-
tions), eliminating some meaconing scenarios is pos-
sible. The security of a combination of mostly un-
trusted signals with one or two trusted differential
signals is an interesting question for further study.
3.5.2 Protocol 3: Passive time-of-flight navi-
gation (pre-authenticated)
For vehicles that are so fast and agile that a public-
key signature verification delay is unacceptable, it’s
possible to authenticate timestamps ahead of time:
The navaid generates a random value r and
chooses times (t1, t2) when it will transmit the fol-
lowing packets. (We assume that the navaid has pre-
viously asserted its identity and position.)
Navaid sends: (Packet 1) (Sent at time t1)
H(r, t2) Hash of r and t2
t1 Timestamp of this packet
Sk(H(r, t2), t1) Signature of hash and t1
The client verifies the signature, stores H(R, t2),
and waits to receive a packet that hashes to that hash.
Navaid sends: (Packet 2) (Sent at time t2)
r Random string r
t2 Timestamp of this packet
The inversion resistance of H guarantees that the
node that sent packet 1 knew r and t2; the navaid’s
signature on H(r, t2) asserts that the navaid gener-
ated r and t2; the unpredictability and novelty of r
ensure that no node could have known r before the
navaid sent it.
Active-client systems
3.6 Carrier frequency shift
Description
A client transmits a signal on a precisely-known
frequency; navaids receive it and respond exactly
at the Doppler-shifted frequency they receive, or
at some other precisely-related frequency; the client
measures the exact received frequency. Substitut-
ing the transmitted and received frequencies into the
Doppler equation gives the client’s velocity relative
to each navaid; that, in turn, can be used to find
the client’s position. As in the related client-passive
scheme, one or both of the protocol participants must
be moving, and one or both must have a predictable
position or path. “Navaids” here can be passive—the
most common application of this technique to naviga-
tion uses the ground itself as a reflector to determine
an aircraft’s groundspeed for dead reckoning.
Examples
Doppler navigation radar; target velocity detec-
tion on other radars
Security
If the interrogation signal is genuinely random, or
cryptographically pseudorandom and not repeated,
an attacker can’t simply transmit a false return sig-
nal. This method is therefore quite secure from mea-
coning when the ground is used as a reference and
the ranging beams are narrow—an attacker would
need to follow the aircraft precisely to supply more
than a few seconds’ worth of incorrect velocities. It
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is significantly less secure if applied to ground-based
navaids, where the same attacks that work on the
passive version apply. It might be securable through
spread-spectrum modulation, but that would impose
strict requirements on oscillator, mixer, and amplifier
design.
3.7 Modulated signal response time
Description
A client transmits a signal pattern; navaids return
a signal pattern as soon as possible. Subtracting pro-
cessing delay and multiplying by the wave speed gives
the distance between the two transmitters. Navaids
for this method can also be passive - for instance,
marine radar reflectors and the ground features used
by terrain-matching radar.
Examples
DME, various types of radar
Security
Very securable. Both interrogation and response
messages can be authenticated, thus making meacon-
ing the only significant vulnerability; the meaconing
threat is covered in detail below. As this method
is not client-passive, it needs transmission security
if low observability is an objective. Frequency hop-
ping and direct-sequence spreading are among the
transmission-security methods in use in radar equip-
ment now.
In interactive protocols, the signature and veri-
fication delay mentioned in Protocol 3 above is at
least doubled, so decoupling the key exchange from
the timing-critical segment is actually crucial.
3.7.1 Protocol 4: Active time-of-flight navi-
gation (pre-authenticated)
We’re designing a public service, so we need to use
asymmetric cryptography. Time-based navigation
protocols need to happen literally at the speed of
light, but asymmetric algorithms are decidedly less
quick, especially considering that to avoid timing at-
tacks on private keys we need to fix the time for each
operation at its worst-case value. Since we can sub-
tract fixed protocol-induced delays from the message
timing used to measure distance, delay error is a mat-
ter of how far the platforms can move during the de-
lay rather than how far signals can travel.
Assume two nodes with no prior knowledge of
their relative position and velocity are moving to-
gether at 103 meters per second.10 We want no more
than 1 meter of positioning error, so 1 millisecond
is the maximum message verification time. Running
two verifications and a signature for a reasonably-
secure digital signature algorithm takes several mil-
liseconds on modern general-purpose microproces-
sors.
However, microsecond-level timing is only crucial
within the actual message exchange. It’s entirely suf-
ficient for participants to know not where they are
right now, but where they were a few milliseconds
ago. We can decouple the long-term secure digital
signature from the timed message via the following
protocol:
The protocol participants agree on a key and sym-
metric encryption algorithm, and authenticate each
other. Each participant generates a random bit se-
quence. The rest of the messages in this protocol
are encrypted with the agreed-upon symmetric algo-
rithm.11
Client sends: (Interrogation)
rc Client’s random string
t Timestamp
The navaid decrypts each incoming packet with
each of the key/cipher pairs that are valid in its area.
Any message that some valid key doesn’t decrypt to
a valid interrogation or reply is dropped. If the time-
stamp is current and the navaid hasn’t received that
rc before, it immediately responds:
Navaid sends: (Response)
rc Client’s random string
rn Navaid’s random string
The client measures the precise time from the be-
ginning of its transmission to the end of the navaid’s
response. For each valid decryption, it subtracts pro-
cessing delay to get the round-trip signal time of flight
and, therefore, the distance to the navaid.
The navaid’s retransmission of the client’s newly-
generated, unpredictable rc demonstrates that the
navaid received the client’s transmission before the
client received the navaid’s response. Thus, no mea-
coner can claim that the difference between the client
and navaid is less than it actually is. All-station mea-
coning will not work against this protocol as long as
10This is at least an order of magnitude slower than the fastest airborne objects, but we assume that faster vehicles can
accept proportionally higher position uncertainty.
11If all of the messages in the protocol are quite short, a block cipher in ECB mode is sufficient; otherwise, they’ll need to
use a robust symmetric encryption mode.
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one navaid above the number necessary to fix 3D po-
sition is within range.
Note that for many key applications—landing
guidance, mid-air traffic avoidance, radio altimetry,
and so on—an attacker being able to increase the
measured distance is a critical safety problem. A
collision-avoidance protocol must therefore either re-
quire at least three non-collinear nodes or use trans-
mission security.
Further analysis of the security of similar
distance-bounding protocols can be found in [5] and
[6].
3.7.2 Protocol 5: Active time-of-flight navi-
gation (post-autenticated)
It might be useful in some situations for nodes to
determine distance without pre-arranging keys. In
essence, we run the previous protocol without en-
cryption, then authenticate the response afterwards.
This loses authentication of interrogations; that could
be restored with the pre-authentication method from
Protocol 3, but then this protocol loses any advantage
it might have over its pre-authenticated counterpart.
Client sends: (Interrogation)
rc Client’s random string
t Timestamp
Navaid sends: (Response)
rc Client’s random string
rn Navaid’s random string
Then the navaid sends the client a signed, public-
key-encrypted message containing rc, rn, its identity,
and everything it knew about its position and radia-
tion pattern when it sent its response:
Navaid sends: (Authentication)
p Navaid position at time t
d Navaid antenna direction at t
t Interrogation timestamp
i Navaid identifier
rc Client’s random string
rn Navaid’s random string
Sk(...) Signature of the above
Since third parties can’t influence or predict rc or
rn, the signed message demonstrates that the navaid
generated its response after it received the interroga-
tion.
3.8 Modulated signal content
Description
A navaid transmits an interrogation signal; the
client responds immediately with either a reflection
of the interrogation or some other data signal; the
navaid then informs the client of its distance and/or
azimuth/elevation angle through data or voice mes-
sages.
Examples
Ground-controlled approach
Security
Securely locating clients works the same and has
essentially the same security considerations as clients
locating themselves; the remainder of the problem
is just transmitting timestamped position messages.
That can be done with any type of authentication,
encryption, and transmission security.
3.9 Other methods
We omit discussion of acoustic and optical means, all
of which except celestial navigation are analogues of
the radionavigation schemes treated here. There are
probably other actual or potential radionavigation
methods. Many properties of radio signals are not
usable for navigation: Polarization is unsuitable be-
cause it is altered by signals’ interactions with me-
dia and the superposition of multipath signals is not
resolvable. Anisotropy in carrier frequency/phase is
subject to multipath distortion and not readily mea-
surable with simple antennae. Carrier phase alone
only specifies distance inside a wavelength, leaving an
integer ambiguity—though it is useful for refining an
existing rough distance measurement; survey-grade
GPS receivers use it that way.
4 Combining navigation tech-
niques
Navigation is always a matter of combining measure-
ments, and more authenticated measurements means
more confidence about position and time. There are
several ways to combine different measurement types
that increase security:
• The navaid transmissions in our first two pas-
sive protocols are identical. A client using Pro-
tocol 1 (passive direction-based navigation) can
use the timestamps given in that protocol as
another Protocol 2 time source, thus adding a
level of meaconing resistance to both protocols.
9
• Active timing-based ranging by a client and
navaid can be daisy-chained into three mes-
sages. Each node calculates the range to the
other and sends a signed, encrypted measure-
ment of that range; if the ranges are different
by more than the nodes could have moved dur-
ing the delay, imperfect meaconing is strongly
indicated.
• The active timing and angle protocols can also
be combined: either a client or a navaid sends
out an interrogation, the other one responds
immediately, and in the certificated exchange
afterward the navaid informs the client of the
direction that the client sent its message from.
• A cleartext passive navigation system such as
GPS can be combined with a small number of
active-response or passive LPI-secure differen-
tial positioning nodes to markedly improve se-
curity against meaconing.
5 Non-navigation protocols
essential to aviation
5.1 Controller-pilot communication
links
The most important factor in preventing mid-air col-
lisions today is voice communication between air traf-
fic controllers and pilots. Separation procedure and
radar surveillance are useless without a channel for
instructions, advisories, and questions.
Intrusion on controller-pilot channels (probably in
the form of false instructions to pilots) has possibly
dire consequences if pilots have no other way to avoid
collision. Imagine two aircraft approaching the same
horizontal point with adequate vertical separation; an
attacker jams the collision-avoidance channel, orders
one of the aircraft to descend to the other’s altitude,
and immediately jams the controller-pilot connection.
One inventive proposed solution[7] implements
aircraft authentication and data transfer as a
steganographic watermark imposed on the analog
voice signal by airborne communication headsets.
However, it appears to be insecure, and it fails to
treat the crucial problem of ensuring that a transmis-
sion is from an air traffic control facility and reason-
ably current. Any secure voice protocol will need to
use a digitized voice signal, strongly bind the voice
content to a timestamped signature, and provide a
key-agreement method. These are well-solved prob-
lems.
Simple jamming is still a serious vulnerability,
though, because current procedures for coping with
two-way radio communications failure[8] rely on lead-
ing other traffic out of the unresponsive aircraft’s
path and landing that aircraft as soon as practicable.
Thus, if aircraft avoided colliding, they would still be
expected to terminate their flights at the nearest ap-
propriate airport that they came into visual contact
with, which would have an enormous economic im-
pact on commercial airlines. Some form of anti-jam
protection is certainly called for.
One possible solution for non-aerobatic aviation,
other than a dedicated secure spread-spectrum voice
band, is establishing a text and geospatial-data mes-
saging system that piggybacks on as many other air-
craft communication and navigation systems as pos-
sible, distributing low-bandwidth messages to every
node assumed to be within line of sight of the desti-
nation. An aircraft in receipt of a current authentic
packet addressed to its area could also then attempt
to forward the packet on a peer-to-peer basis. Mes-
sages would include specific instructions to aircraft,
general traffic advisories, weather and turbulence in-
formation, cryptographic certificate revocations, and
possibly other keying information. Messages from
aircraft to controllers and other aircraft could also
be forwarded, on a strict non-interference basis.
Public-key cryptography is applicable to trans-
mission security. Each node could have several rela-
tively simple spread-spectrum transceivers and could
use a key-agreement protocol to establish transmis-
sion security keys with navaids, air traffic control fa-
cilities, and peer aircraft via any other available node.
Alternatively, generating transmission security keys
could be part of filing a flight plan. Each landing-
guidance installation could have a radio that toggled
between the transmission security parameters for ex-
pected inbound aircraft, and several radios that com-
municated with the nearest few craft.
Another simple way to decrease the impact of
jammers on communication is equipping each aircraft
with two antennae with hemispherical reception pat-
terns, one pointed up and one down.12 For aircraft
with normal en-route attitudes, this prevents jam-
mers above the aircraft (like balloons) from blocking
12TCAS does something like this, and the F-16 has upper and lower antennae for UHF voice and SADL, but neither imple-
mentation seems to be designed to adaptively detect and avoid jamming.
10
signals from below (like landing-guidance transmit-
ters) and vice versa, and is especially powerful when
combined with the above peer-to-peer distribution
network in the presence of a mixture of ground-based,
satellite, and airborne communication nodes.
5.2 Identification protocols
Civilian aircraft are identified by a 4-digit transpon-
der code assigned on the fly by air traffic con-
trollers and entered by pilots. The cockpit-selectable
transponder ID system is a waste of pilot and con-
troller time and a security risk. Aircraft should be
identified by a globally unique code at all times;
anonymity of general aviation flights can be preserved
by encrypting transponder transmissions. The newer
Mode S standard uses globally unique identifiers, but
provides no anonymity and no protection against im-
personation.
Military aircraft in the USA and USA-allied na-
tions use the Mark XII IFF protocol to identify air-
borne objects. Mark XII is (weakly) cryptographi-
cally authenticated but has no transmission security;
it could easily be denied by jamming. Since lack of
IFF response is sometimes taken to indicate a hostile
aircraft, IFF jamming in a complex battlefield set-
ting could lead to fratricide. Several friendly-fire in-
cidents attributable in part to IFF malfunctions have
happened in the last few years.[9]
5.3 Position-reporting protocols
The current paradigm in aviation protocols is ADS-
B,13 in which aircraft determine their position by
some method (generally assumed to be GPS) and
then broadcast their identification, location, and
various other data. Traffic controllers and pilots
can use the position reports to plan optimal routes
while ensuring aircraft separation, which promises to
markedly increase efficiency and ease psychological
workloads, among a host of other benefits.
Of course this is only as secure and reliable as the
positioning sources that it depends on. As for ADS-
B itself, it should be trivially easy to add encrypted
versions of the payload packets for clients who require
anonymity to peers, a “key agreement” packet type to
handle cryptographic setup, and a “digital signature”
packet type that aggregates timestamped signatures
for several recent packets. An additional packet type
should be defined for airborne and ground nodes to
report discrepancies between GPS position and en-
vironmental observables, and between other nodes’
stated and radar-measured positions.
A potential concern with frequent automatic po-
sition reporting is that it gives attackers a feedback
channel into how their meaconing is affecting the tar-
gets’ notion of position. Also, the TIS-B protocol,
which is part of the ADS-B suite, has ground radar
facilities transmittting locations of aircraft as deter-
mined from primary and secondary radar and ADS.
While this is wonderful for safety, it also provides
malicious users with an oracle into their radar de-
tectability and the efficacy of ECM techniques, so its
costs and benefits require careful consideration.
5.4 Emergency rescue transponders
Distress-beacon detection satellites (SARSAT/
COSPAS) and rescue crews have limited capacity
and no authentication system. An adversary who
wanted to prevent downed aircraft from being lo-
cated could do so quite easily by activating rogue
emergency location transmitters (ELTs) in the gen-
eral vicinity of the actual distressed craft, potentially
with the same identification information as the legit-
imate ELTs. Fake ELTs can be built cheaply.
6 Certificate structure
Navigation involves many changing security-related
values and little spare bandwidth, so the sort of
monolithic certificate used in most Internet protocols
is not really appropriate. We suggest the use of a
modular certificate format, with small certificates at-
testing to a small set of facts, transmitted upon re-
quest and/or broadcast periodically. All certificates
should contain:
• A set of assertions
• The time range in which the assertions are valid
• The identifier of the node about which asser-
tions are being made
• The public key of the certifier
• A signature of a hash of the certificate
Some common assertions are:
13Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
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• Navigation-related information: Position, an-
tenna pointing angle (as functions of time - for
instance, Keplerian orbital elements for satel-
lites)
• Identifying information: Tail number, aircraft
type and model
• Cryptographic delegation information: Public
keys of nodes
• Information describing why someone should
trust the node’s public key: Key-holding de-
vice manufacturer/model, cryptographic secu-
rity type (unverified, remotely secure, tamper-
resistant)[10], cryptographic verification au-
thority, physical security level (unsecured,
alarmed, sealed, supervised), owner, owner type
(individual, airline, etc.)
• Information that can help with non-
cryptographic security verification: [11],[12]
Platform type (surface, airborne, etc.), receiver
sensitivity and transmitter power output (given
as spherical functions of antenna pointing an-
gle)
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